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Abstract—Speaker verification systems are vulnerable to spoof-
ing attacks which presents a major problem in their real-life
deployment. To date, most of the proposed synthetic speech
detectors (SSDs) have weighted the importance of different
segments of speech equally. However, different attack methods
have different strengths and weaknesses and the traces that they
leave may be short or long term acoustic artifacts. Moreover,
those may occur for only particular phonemes or sounds. Here,
we propose three algorithms that weigh likelihood-ratio scores
of individual frames, phonemes, and sound-classes depending on
their importance for the SSD. Significant improvement over the
baseline system has been obtained for known attack methods
that were used in training the SSDs. However, improvement
with unknown attack types was not substantial. Thus, the type
of distortions that were caused by the unknown systems were
different and could not be captured better with the proposed
SSD compared to the baseline SSD.
Index Terms—speaker verification, spoofing, synthetic speech
detector
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the biggest obstacles in deployment of speaker
verification technology in real-life scenarios, especially in
high-security applications such as telephone banking, is the
difficulty in countering spoofing attacks. Even though verifica-
tion of speaker identity through human voice has been shown
to be successful [1], state-of-the art verification systems have
been shown to be vulnerable to spoofing attacks using speech
synthesis and voice conversion [2].
Most of the literature on the spoofing problem has focused
on algorithms that were designed to counter specific types of
attacks. For example, one method of synthesizing speech is
the HMM-based approach where smooth speech parameters
are generated and speech is synthesized with a vocoder. Even
though HMM-based synthesis can successfully spoof the mod-
ern verification systems, it is also easy to detect by exploiting
the unnaturally smooth trajectories of the parameters [3][4][5].
Moreover, because the vocoder typically has a minimum-phase
filter, phase was also used for detecting HMM-based synthesis
since natural speech spectrum is not minimum phase [6].
Even though unit selection synthesis is relatively harder
to detect, it is also challenging to deploy in the context of
spoofing since unlike the HMM-based approach that can adapt
to the target with seconds of data, unit selection requires
hours of training data. Such large amounts of data is hard
to collect for each target speaker in most practical cases.
Existing synthetic speech detectors (SSDs) typically use jumps
in fundamental frequency at the concatenation points for
detection [7][8].
Voice conversion algorithms can also be used for spoof-
ing [2]. Because they typically use minimum-phase vocoders,
phase was used in [9][10] for detecting voice-converted
speech. Moreover, some voice conversion systems exhibit
low parameter variability across an utterance compared to
natural speech and that was also exploited for detecting voice
conversion [11].
There are also SSDs that are independent of the attack
type. One promising approach is to use a local binary pattern
(LBP) analysis for feature extraction [12]. In that approach,
a one-class classifier is trained with features derived only
from natural speech. The classifier learns the spectro-temporal
model of speech and can detect synthetic signals that do not fit
well to that model. In [13], i-vectors are used both for speaker
verification and synthetic speech detection. The detector and
speaker verification scores are fused to make a final decision.
Here, we investigate several detectors without attack-
specific prior assumptions. Our approach is based on the
hypothesis that long- and/or short-duration artifacts will be
observed in the synthetic speech without any constraints on the
type of artifacts. Artifacts that typically occur in stop sounds
during synthesis because of their rapidly changing dynamics
and sudden glitches that occur frequently with the unit selec-
tion systems are examples of short-duration artifacts. Overly-
smooth parameters generated with HMM-based synthesis is an
example to long-duration artifacts. The SSD algorithm should
be sensitive to both types of artifacts to be effective.
In this paper, we have investigated SSDs that can capture
both short and long-duration artifacts. The first SSD was
developed using an unsupervised approach where a Gaussian
mixture model (GMM) is trained for natural speech and a
GMM is trained for synthetic speech. After aligning each
speech frame with a Gaussian, each Gaussian component is
treated as an independent detector and detector scores are
fused with logistic regression.
Our second method is based on designing detectors that
are focused on detecting artifacts in specific phonemes. This
approach can be successful at detecting phoneme-specific
artifacts in synthetic speech. However, some of the phonemes
are not observed frequently enough in most utterances. To
reduce the data sparsity issue, broad-level sound class detec-
tors are used in a third approach. Similar to the Gaussian
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Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed synthetic speech detectors.
approach, score fusion is done for the phoneme- and class-
based methods.
All three methods performed substantially better than the
baseline detector that treats all Gaussians and phonemes
equally for the known attack types. However, the proposed
systems did not substantially improve the baseline system for
unknown attack types. Fusing the three proposed detectors
further improved the SSD performance both in known and
unknown conditions.
II. SYNTHETIC SPEECH DETECTORS
An overview of the proposed system is shown in Fig. 1.
Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) are first extracted
from the speech utterance. Then, the feature vectors are
grouped together into J groups. In one approach, vectors that
are aligned with the same Gaussian component of a GMM
are grouped together. In another approach, feature vectors that
belong to the same phoneme or sound class constitute a group.
Details of grouping are described in the next section.
After grouping, log-likelihood ratio (LLR) detection is done
for each group of feature vectors. To compute LLR, a GMM is
trained for natural speech and a GMM is trained for synthetic
speech. Same GMMs are used for all J groups. Once the
score of each group is computed, score fusion is done using
a logistic regression function to compute the final score S(u).
A hard threshold is used to compute the final decision.
In the baseline detector, which does not use any grouping,
given an utterance u, assuming independent speech frames
LLR(u) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
log(xi|Λnat)− log(xi|Λsyn), (1)
where N is the total number of frames, xi is the feature vector
for the ith frame, Λnat is the canonical model of GMM for
the natural speech, and Λsyn is the canonical model of GMM
for the synthetic speech. The final decision is done using a
hard threshold for LLR(u).
In the proposed approach, the decision is based on the
utterance score
S(u) = Φ(S1, S2, ..., SJ) (2)
where Φ is a nonlinear function and score Sj for each group
j is
1
Nj
Nj∑
i=1
log(x
(j)
i |Λnat)− log(x(j)i |Λsyn). (3)
The rationale of this approach is to develop detectors that
are focused on different segments of speech and weigh each
segment depending on its information content. For example,
nasals are typically not modeled well by vocoders because of
the spectral dip in nasals that are not modeled with an all-
pole model. A detector that is focused only on nasals can
detect those artifacts. Similarly, synthetic speech may contain
some short-duration glitches that are not observed in natural
speech. Even though those artifacts may be detectable by some
of the Gaussian components in synthetic GMMs. when the
frame likelihoods are averaged as in Eq. 1, those short-duration
events may not be detected because of the low weight they
get and noise introduced in other frames. Focusing on those
highly informative Gaussians regardless of their durations
and assigning them high weight can improve the detection
performance in those cases.
A. Duration-based Weighting
Distribution of the frame-level LLR values approximately
follow a Gaussian distribution in most utterances. By averag-
ing the LLR scores, as done in Eq. 3, assuming Gaussianity,
a maximum-likelihood (ML) estimate of the mean is found.
Considering the fact that the ML estimate of the mean of
a Gaussian has an estimation variance that is inversely pro-
portional with the number of observations, reliability of the
detector j increases when Nj increases. To take the estimation
variance, hence the uncertainty of the detector scores, into
account, we propose the duration-weighted score
S
′
j = ln(Nj + 1)Sj (4)
where ln(.) is the natural logarithm.
III. FEATURE GROUPING METHODS
Three feature grouping strategies are investigated. In the
phoneme-based approach, each phoneme constitutes a group.
Thus, feature vectors that occur within a particular phoneme
type in the utterance are grouped together.
One of the problems with the phoneme-based approach is
that some of the utterances provided in the challenge were
short ( 2-3seconds) which means that many of the phonemes
were not observed in those cases. Because broad acoustic-
phonetic sound classes share similar acoustic properties, we
hypothesized that if a system performs poorly in synthesizing
a phoneme, it will most likely perform poorly for the other
phonemes that are acoustically similar. Thus, to make more
data available for each group, a class-based approach is
used for grouping in the second approach. In the class-based
approach, five sound classes are used: vowels, nasals, glides,
stops, and rest. The rest class contains all phonemes that do
not belong to the other four classes.
The phoneme- and class-based methods are good at detect-
ing artifacts that occur in relatively long segments. However,
they are not designed for detecting sudden glitches that can
easily occur with unit selection systems or some of the voice
conversion systems. Location of those glitches are random for
the most part and they may not be detected with detectors that
are focused on long-duration segments.
To address the issue of short-duration artifact detection, we
propose Gaussian-based grouping where each frame in the
utterance is first aligned with the GMM of natural speech.
Then, frames that are aligned with the same Gaussian are
grouped together. This approach allows detection of frame-
level artifacts and assign them high weight even though they
may occur infrequently in the utterance.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experiment Setup
The synthetic speech detectors were trained with 19 MFCCs
together with the delta and delta-delta features. In short-time
analysis, frame length was 25msec and frame rate was 10msec.
Bigaussian voice activity detection (VAD) was used where
energy of the speech and noise frames are modeled with single
Gaussians and likelihood ratio detector is used to detect speech
frames.
The baseline synthetic speech detector had a 512-component
GMM to model natural speech. Similarly, synthetic speech
was modeled with 512-component GMM. For natural speech,
GMM training was initialized using k-means clustering. The
GMM for synthetic speech was adapted from the GMM of the
natural speech using a maximum a posteriori (MAP) approach.
Experiments with synthetic speech GMM that was trained
independent of the natural speech GMM were also performed
for comparison.
The phoneme-based approach requires a phoneme recog-
nizer since the transcriptions of the challenge data were
not available. The Hungarian phoneme recognizer [14] was
trained with WSJ-CAM database and used here for phoneme
recognition. A total of 37 phonemes were used. Outputs of the
phoneme recognizer were mapped to sound classes and used
in sound-class based detector also.
The spoofing challenge database1 was used for training,
development and evaluation of all systems. The BOSARIS
toolkit [15] was used to train the logistic regression algorithm
that was used for fusing the scores of detectors.
B. Results and Discussion
Experimental results for the development and evaluation
data are shown in Table I. The baseline LLR detector is
trained with two different methods. In one approach (LLR-
noAdapt), two independent GMMs are trained for the natural
and synthetic speech. In the second approach (LLR-Adapt), a
GMM is trained for natural speech and then adapted to the
synthetic speech using MAP adaptation.
The LLR-Adapt system performed better for known con-
ditions while LLR-noAdapt performed better for unknown
conditions. Thus, even though LLR-Adapt performed better
than LLR-noAdapt on average, it could not generalize as good
as the LLR-noAdapt. This result indicates that, during GMM
training, some of the novel clusters in the synthetic data that
1http://www.spoofingchallenge.org/asvSpoof.pdf
were useful for ambiguity detection, could not be modeled
well with adaptation of GMM for natural speech.
Gaussian-based system performed better than class- and
phoneme-based methods both for known and unknown condi-
tions. In particular, Gaussian-based approach performed better
for the S1, S2, and S5 methods, all of which are voice
conversion algorithms. Unlike the phoneme- and class-based
systems, Gaussian-based detector can learn to detect short-
duration artifacts. Thus, the presence of short-duration acoustic
distortions seems to be more informative for detecting voice
conversion attacks.
Class-based system performed better for S3 and phoneme-
based system performed better for S4 attack methods. Both
S3 and S4 are generated with HMM-based TTS. Unlike the
voice conversion systems, HMM-based TTS systems generate
smooth trajectories. Thus, sudden acoustic distortions are
rarely generated with those systems. In this case, overly-
smooth longer segments seem to be more informative for
detection. Small distortions in a long segment can be de-
tected well with class- and phoneme-specific detectors that
are focused on particular segments. However, Gaussian-based
approach is not expected to be as successful with this type of
attack because speech frames are generated with a maximum-
likelihood approach in HMM-based synthesis. Thus, the pa-
rameter generation algorithm is designed to generate high
likelihoods for each frame and individual Gaussians are not
expected to detect the artifacts in features.
Duration-based weighting consistently improved class- and
phoneme-based performance. However, for the Gaussian-
based approach, performance improved slightly for the un-
known systems and degraded slightly for the known systems.
We believe there are at least two major factors behind this
result. Firstly, because an important strength of the Gaussian-
approach is its ability to detect short-time artifacts, weighting
with duration can hurt its performance. Secondly, duration
of observed Gaussians can change significantly depending on
the spoofing system used which can increase the variability
of features and make the detection task harder. Because
ASR systems take phoneme durations into account during
recognition, that effect is not as important in the phoneme-
and class-based methods.
The core hypothesis in the proposed system was that dif-
ferent Gaussians, phonemes, sound-classes contribute different
amounts of information for synthetic speech detection. To test
that hypothesis, experiments were performed with each Gaus-
sian, phoneme, and sound-class separately. For the Gaussian
case, results are shown in Fig. 2, for the phoneme case, results
are shown in Fig. 3. In both cases, large variation in detection
performance can be observed which verifies our hypothesis.
Detector results for the class-based system is shown in
Table II. Performance of each class is significantly different
from each other and they change substantially depending on
the attack method. Also note that, even though vowel class is
observed more than other classes, their performance is better
than other systems only for HMM-based TTS attacks. For the
voice-conversion attacks, short-duration stop sounds become
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE OF THE BASELINE AND PROPOSED DETECTORS IN TERMS OF EQUAL-ERROR-RATES (EERS) FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION
DATA. RESULTS ARE PRESENTED WITH AND WITHOUT DURATION-WEIGHTING. S1, S2, AND S5 SYSTEMS USE VOICE CONVERSION (VC). S3 AND S4
SYSTEMS USE HMM-BASED SYNTHESIS. BEST PERFORMING ALGORITHM FOR EACH ATTACK TYPE IS SHOWN IN BOLD.
Normal Duration-based weighted
LLR Logistic Regression Logistic Regression
noAdapt Adapt Class Phoneme Gaussian Fusion Class Phoneme Gaussian Fusion
Development
S1 0.47 0.76 0.68 0.69 0.47 0.41 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.46
S2 10.24 5.12 3.37 3.41 1.89 1.83 2.99 3.13 2.26 2.20
S3 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.11
S4 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.25 0.20 0.03 0.07 0.20 0.13
S5 4.63 3.04 2.78 2.86 1.72 1.57 2.65 2.72 1.59 1.47
Total 4.21 2.42 1.92 1.77 1.17 1.11 1.67 1.66 1.19 1.14
Evaluation
S1 0.54 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.48 0.41 0.51 0.50 0.46 0.42
S2 9.24 4.47 2.78 2.71 1.89 1.75 2.63 2.44 2.15 2.03
S3 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.09
S4 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.08
S5 3.95 1.72 1.99 2.14 1.48 1.36 1.89 1.97 1.50 1.40
S6 3.49 1.35 1.39 1.40 1.09 0.98 1.31 1.24 1.13 1.01
S7 1.91 1.65 0.84 0.87 0.75 0.63 0.85 0.94 0.70 0.65
S8 0.46 1.03 0.76 0.85 0.83 0.70 0.71 0.87 0.79 0.70
S9 0.43 1.26 0.93 1.02 0.76 0.65 0.94 1.02 0.68 0.64
S10 27.24 29.62 32.14 33.59 30.05 29.81 31.39 32.25 29.88 29.78
Known 2.77 1.36 1.08 1.10 0.84 0.75 1.02 0.99 0.88 0.81
Unknown 6.70 6.98 7.21 7.54 6.70 6.55 7.04 7.27 6.64 6.55
All 4.74 4.17 4.15 4.32 3.77 3.65 4.03 4.13 3.76 3.68
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Fig. 2. Detection performance of each Gaussian component versus its
logarithm of number of occurrence in the development utterances is shown.
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE OF EACH OF THE SOUND-CLASS DETECTORS MEASURED
IN TERMS OF EQUAL-ERROR-RATES (EERS) FOR THE DEVELOPMENT
DATA. FREQUENCY OF OBSERVATION IN DEVELOPMENT UTTERANCES IS
ALSO SHOWN FOR EACH CLASS TYPE.
Class S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 All Freq.
Vowel 3.52 13.30 0.65 0.74 7.26 6.35 0.542
Nasal 8.90 20.82 5.09 5.86 13.79 11.62 0.156
Glide 9.33 21.69 4.10 4.44 15.92 12.15 0.118
Stop 2.24 4.78 0.70 0.78 6.77 3.68 0.112
Rest 8.97 10.58 3.32 3.78 16.08 9.43 0.072
Log-Number of Occurrence
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Fig. 3. Detection performance of each phoneme versus its logarithm of
number of occurrence in the development utterances is shown. Phonemes
that are in the same sound-class are shown with the same color and shape.
more informative even though they occur far less frequently
than the vowels.
Fig. 2 shows the correlation of number of occurrences vs
EER computed with each of the 512 Gaussians. Even though
EER and durations have a negative correlation, the pattern
is weak and does not impact the overall detector performance
significantly. This result is inline with the finding that duration-
based weighting does not improve the performance of the
Gaussian-based system.
The effect of duration is more significant with phoneme-
based detector compared to the Gaussian-based detector. Du-
ration versus EER is shown in Fig. 3 where a stronger
negative correlation is observed compared to the Gaussian case
especially for the vocalic sounds. The correlation disappears
for some of the highly informative stop and fricative sounds.
The proposed detectors performed substantially better than
the baseline detectors for known attack types. However, the
difference is not substantial for the unknown attack types. To
further boost the performance, the detectors were fused with
a second stage of logistic regression algorithm. The fusion
improved performance both for known and unknown attack
types which indicate that the detectors generate complemen-
tary information.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have investigated a multi-detector approach for synthetic
speech detection where each detector is focused on a particular
acoustic segment. The Gaussian-based detector performed
better in voice conversion attacks. Phoneme- and class-based
detectors performed better for HMM-based synthesis attacks.
Duration-based feature normalization improved the phoneme-
and class-based systems but not the Gaussian-based system.
The proposed systems performed substantially better than the
baseline system in known attack types. In unknown attacks,
the improvement was not substantial. Fusing the scores of
proposed detectors further improved the performance in both
known and unknown conditions.
Our goal in this paper was to take a commonly used likeli-
hood ratio based SSD and use it in a segment-specific manner.
The hypothesis here was that different segments contribute
different amounts of information and their scores should
be weighted accordingly. Results confirmed our hypothesis.
Because we did not assume any prior information, we have
used the commonly used MFCC features. In the future work,
we will investigate a richer set of features and other classifiers
such as SVM to further improve the detection performance.
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